Similarities between Ellipsis and Phonological Reduction
Constituents containing E or PR must receive a parallel interpretation to the interpretation of an antecedent. More specifically when an antecedent is ambiguous, the relevant constituent that contains E or PR must be disambiguated in the same manner that the antecedent is; ambiguities do not multiply in ECs and PRCs. This is exemplified in ( Identity of dependencies: a. John} introduced Fred to his} mother. Bill2 did, too <introduce Fred3 to his2l*3 mother>. b. John} introduced Fred to his} mother. Bill introduced Fred 3 to hisu* 3 mother, too.
Identity of Scopal relations: a. First I introduced a boy to every girl and then YOU did. b. First I introduced a boy to every girl and then YOU introduced a boy to every girl.
c. A boy admires every teacher and a GIRL does, too. d. A boy admires every teacher and a GIRL admires every teacher, too.
The antecedent for E and PR in (1), John likes flying planes, contains an ambiguous predicate. Parallelism ensures that the elided/reduced predicate will be disambiguated in the same manner. Thus, if the sentence attributes to John the property of liking the activity of flying planes, it cannot attribute to Bill the property of liking planes that fly. The same properties must be attributed to John and Bill. Similarly in (2) when the pronoun in the antecedent sentence is bound by the subject, the pronoun in the ellipsis/reduction sentence cannot be bound by the object. If ellipsis/reduction is resolved by sloppy identity, the pronouns must be bound from parallel syntactic positions. Finally when the antecedent and the ellipsis/reduction sentence contain more than one quantifier, the relative scope of the quantifiers must be identical in the two sentences, as illustrated by the interpretations available in (3).
Focus and Parallelism
As pointed out by Rooth (1992) and Tancredi (1992) , the effects of Parallelism observed in (1) (2) (3) follow from an independently needed theory of focus. Sentences that contain E or PR share prosodic properties which have very specific implications for their focus structure . That is, a constituent which is phonologically reduced or elided doesn't bear pitch accent, and this has consequences for its focus structure: the elided/reduced constituent is not F( ocus) marked. Furthermore, given the nature of focus projection, it is not dominated by an F-marked constituent. 2
To explain how the parallelism requirement follows, I will make a simplifying assumption about the domain at which focus presuppositions are determined (the focus domain). Specifically, I will assume that the domain is sentential. The general theory of focus requires that for every focus domain, the discourse will contain an antecedent --a linguistic object which is a member of the focus value. Parallelism then follows as a consequence of focus theory:
Parallelism (first attempt): Every sentence, S, requires that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence, A, which belongs to the focus value of S. 3
It follows that ellipsis and phonological reduction require an antecedent sentence which is parallel to the ellipsis sentence, in the sense illustrated in (1) (2) (3) . To see this, consider the constructions in (2).
(2) a. John} introduced Fred to his} mother. Bill2 did, too <introduce Fred3 to hisv*3 mother>. b. John} introduced Fred to his} mother. Bill2 introduced Fred 3 to his2/* 3 mother, too.
Because there is no pitch accent in the verb phrase, the verb phrase is not F marked. The subject, on the other hand, has to be F-marked (since it is distinct from the subject of the antecedent sentence). The focus value of the second sentence is either (5a) or (5b) depending on whether the pronoun his is bound by the subject Bill or by the object Fred. 4
John] introduced Fred to his] mother is a member of to the former but not of the latter.
It is now easy to see that the antecedent sentence is a member of the focus value of the sentence containing E or PR only if the subject is the binder of the pronoun in the latter (that is, only if (5a) is the focus value).
Differences Between Ellipsis and Phonological Reduction
The picture that emerges at this point is very simple. ECs and PRCs have the same focus structure, and given an independently needed theory of focus both must satisfy a parallelism requirement. However, it turns out that things are a little bit more complicated. Specifically, it turns out that the theory of focus yields a parallelism requirement which is weaker than the one stated in (4). This requirement accounts for the environments in which PR is possible but is too weak to account for E. Consider the PRCs in (6). In these constructions, Parallelism as defined in (4) Because PR is licensed in (6), we must conclude that focus theory yields a weaker parallelism requirement than (4). More specifically, it seems that the antecedent for focus need not be present in the discourse; it can be accommodated when it is entailed by the sentences that are present in the discourse together with certain shared assumptions. The first sentence in (6a) does not belong to the focus value of the sentence that contains PR (henceforth, SPR)' However, with the assumption that calling someone an idiot is an insult, the first sentence entails the accommodated sentence Bill insulted Mary and the latter belongs to F(SPR)' Similarly, with the assumption that John saw many women, the first sentence in (6b) entails the accommodated sentence John talked to many woman, which belongs to F(SPR)' Focus theory requires either Direct Parallelism as defined in (4) or Indirect Parallelism (via accommodation):
Parallelism: Every sentence, S, requires either a. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence, A, which belongs to the focus value of S. (Ae F(S» (Direct Parallelism) or b. that the discourse will contain a sentence, A, which together with certain shared assumptions entails another sentence, the accommodated sentence, AC, and ACe F(S). (Indirect Parallelism)S Parallelism, as defined in (7), can still account for the phenomena exemplified in (1-3). 6 However, it turns out that (7) is too weak to account for the conditions that must be met for ellipsis to be possible. This is seen when we compare the constructions that involve PR, (6), to their counterparts with E in (8 
The proposal
What we've learned in the previous section is that although the theory of focus accounts for the constraints on PR and for a substantial part of the constraints on E, there are some restrictions on E that it cannot account for. Specifically focus theory, which must allow for Indirect Parallelism to account for the availability of PR in (6), does not account for the unavailability of E in (8).
There must be something other than focus that accounts for the inability of Indirect Parallelism to license E in (8) . Two possibilities come to mind. The first is that while both E and PR are constrained by (7), there is an additional condition which restricts E but not PRo The second possibility is that there is a condition on the availability of the accommodated sentences (needed for Indirect Parallelism) and this condition distinguishes ECs from PRCs. Rooth (1992) investigates the first possibility and Tancredi (1992) investigates the second.
Tancredi 's proposal and Rooth 's argument against it
Tancredi (1992) points out that in PRCs, in contrast to ECs, the phonologically reduced material indicates the nature of the accommodated sentence. In ellipsis there is no such indication (since the material is deleted). Therefore, Tancredi proposes that E, in contrast to PR, must satisfy Direct Parallelism. (Tancredi 1992: 127-131 ; see also Wold 1995).
Rooth, however, discovered a case in which E, just like PR, is licensed via Indirect Parallelism. First consider the EC in (9). This construction exemplifies the requirement of identical dependencies discussed in section 1.1. If the object is the binder of the pronouns in the antecedent sentence, the subject cannot bind the pronoun in the ellipsis sentence. In these constructions the binding dependencies are not identical: the object binds the pronoun in the ellipsis sentence, while in the antecedent sentence the subject does. Consequnetly the antecedent sentence is not in the focus value of the ellipsis sentence (which contains sentences of the form x heard that I was bad-mouthing x). Indirect Parallelism accounts for this mismatch. The antecedent sentence allows the accommodation of the sentence Mary/every girl heard that I was bad mouthing her and the latter belongs to the focus value of the ellipsis sentence.
Given (10) (and an additional consideration to which I return in section 5) Rooth concludes that in addition to Parallelism as defined in (7), there is a special identity condition which applies to E but not to PRo This condition explains the unavailability of E in (8), in contrast to the availability of PR in (6).
A problems fo r the fo rmulation of the identity condition
Rooth's Identity condition on E is meant to ensure that an elided VP would not be substantially different from the antecedent VP as in (8) . In the next sub-section, I will suggest a different way of looking at the contrast between (6) and (8). But first I would like to point out a difficulty in the formulation of the identity condition.
Consider cases of Antecedent Contained Deletion exemplified in (11). At Surface Structure the antecedent VP contains the elided VP and therefore the two are not identical . This means that the identity condition on E can be satisfied at Logical Form (LF) once QR has taken place and (as a result) the VPs are identical.
(11) I saw every man that you did <saw t>.
Consider now (12), and focus on the interpretation in which the adjective likely outscopes the subject (scopal relationships being identical in the ellipsis and the antecedent sentence as (7) requires).
(12) Someone from NY is likely to win the lottery and someone from Boston is, too.
If narrow scope for the subject requires an LF representation in which the subject is c-commanded by the adjective (as argued for in May 1977 and more recently in Sportiche 1996, Romero 1997 and Fox 1999) the antecedent and elided VP would not be identical at LF. This means that the identity condition must be allowed to hold at Surface Structure. The conclusion from (11) and (12) is that the identity condition can hold both at Surface Structure and at LF.8 This, of course, is not a contradiction, but I think it should inspire one to search for altematives.9
An economy condition on accommodation
As mentioned above, Tancredi's suggestion that E can be licensed only by Direct
Parallelism cannot account for the availability of sloppy identity in (10). What might indicate that accommodation is necessary in order to satisfy the focus requirements of a given sentence? A natural answer is the existence of overt (i.e. pronounced) constituents that are non-F-marked in the sentence and are nevertheless absent in the targeted antecedent. I will call these constituents the "accommodation-seeking material".
In other wordd I would like to propose that given a potential antecedent, A, accommodation is possible only when the sentence containing E or PR, S, contains accommodation-seeking material . This economy condition is stated as follows:
(13)
Accommodation of a new antecedent for S, AC, must have a trigger.
(14)
Accommodation has a trigger when S contains accommodation-seeking material, i.e., when S contains pronounced non-F-marked material which is absent in A ..
Focus , PARALLELISM AND ACCOMMODATION
The intuition behind this proposal is that only accommodation-seeking material indicates that accommodation is necessary; other material is either:
a. deleted (hence indicates nothing)
b. already present in the antecedent (hence indicates that accommodation is not necessary) or c. F-marked (thus identified as "new information" --indicating, once again, that accommodation is not necessary) .
The condition in (13) distinguishes (8) from both (6) and (10) . In the next section, I will provide additional evidence in favor of this condition. However, it will turn out that (13) is a necessary but still insufficient condition for accommodation. In section 4, I will propose a stronger condition which will (hopefully) allow for accommodation in exactly those cases where it is possible.
Further evidence in favor of the economy condition
In the previous section we saw that an economy condition on accommodation can distinguish Ees which require Direct Parallelism from Ees and PRes which can be licensed only by Indirect Parallelism. With such a condition it is conceivable that the identity condition on ellipsis will not be needed to account for the differences between E and PRo In this section, I will provide independent evidence for the economy condition, and against an identity condition.
Specifically, I will argue (a) that in cases where the identity condition on E is not at stake both E and PR cannot be licensed by Indirect Parallelism if the economy condition is not satisfied and (b) that when the economy condition is satisfied, Indirect parallelism is possible even in cases where an identity condition on E would not be satisfied. If successful, the first argument will make an identity condition on E redundant, and the second argument will make it untenable. This contrast is unexpected without the economy condition stated in (13). The reason it is unexpected is that the focus value of the relevant sentence that contains E, SE, in (15b) properly contains the focus value of the parallel sentence in (15a). Therefore, by Parallelism as defined in (7) Why, then, is sloppy identity blocked in (15b)? (13) provides the answer.
SE lacks non-F-dominated material which is absent in A, and thus there is no trigger for accommodation.
(16) argues that (13) restricts PR as well as E. (16a,b) are the phonological reduction analogs of (15a,b). (16c) shows that when (13) is not satisfied sloppy identity requires the pronoun to be focused (thus making accommodation unnecessary). (In (16c), F(S PR ) is the set of sentences of the form x V I was bad mouthing y. A is a sentence of the relevant form if we make the independently needed assumption that convinced Mary is a possible alternative to deny.) To complete the argument for (13), it is important to show (empirically) that the potential accommodation (Ma ry] came to believe that I was bad mouthing heY] ) is Directly Parallel to the E-or PR-sentence in (I5b, 16b) . In other words, it is important to provide empirical evidence that without (13), Focus, PARALLELISM AND ACCOMMODATION Indirect Parallelism would wrongly predict Sloppy identity to be possible in these constructions. This evidence is provided in (17). Here the antecedent sentence is already (in all relevant respects) identical to the sentence that needed to be accommodated in (ISb, 16b) . The fact that sloppy identity is possible in (17) argues that the only thing that blocked sloppy identity in (1Sb, 16b) The reason for this disambiguation is not crucial for the purposes of this paper, but for expository purposes, I will adopt the account I provided in Fox (1995, in press ). According to this account an economy condition on the mechanism that · Anti-disambiguation is expected given Indirect Parallelism. The reason is that the antecedent sentence allows for the accommodation of a sentence that would be parallel to the E or PR sentence under Inverse Scope. (If Mary admires every teacher it follows that for every teacher there is a girl who admires the teacher and if John is very likely to win the lottery it follows that it is very likely that someone from John's city will win the lottery.
II)
Notice that the economy condition on accommodation, (13), is satisfied as well. The subject of the E and PR sentences in (21, 22) contains non-F-Marked material that is absent in the antecedent, and hence accommodation has a trigger. I will now try to show that without the trigger disambiguation cannot be obviated. This is predicted by the economy condition and (if correct) a rgues in favor of it. b. John likes every teacher. At least two girls do, too.
1.2.2. Th e argument:
This contrast is expected once the economy condition on accommodation is taken into account. To see this, we have to know the focus structure of the E and PR sentences. Given that pitch-accent falls on the most embedded constituent in the DP, there are two possibilities for F-marking (see Jackendoff 1972) . F-marking can target (a) the whole DP or (b) a smaller constituent which excludes the quantificational material (someone in (23a) and at least one in (24a» .
Let's consider how Economy and Parallelism determine the LF representations of (23-24) given the constraint on accommodation in (13). I will focus on (24) and leave it for the reader to see that the account extends to (23). Anti-disambiguation is predicted for (24a). The basic idea is that disambiguation, which is the standard prediction of Economy and Parallelism, is obviated by the availability of Indirect Parallelism. (A (=John likes every teacher) entails AC (=at least one boy likes every teacher with Inverse Scope), and A C is an appropriate antecedent for SE (=At least one girl likes every teacher with Inverse Scope)
The economy condition on accommodation is satisfied in (24a) if there is narrow focus on the common noun girl (as in (24'ai)), but isn't satisfied if there is focus on the whole DP (as in (24'aii» . If there is focus on the whole DP on the other hand, AC does belong to F(SE ) (the set of sentences of the form Every teacher y QPx x like y), but the economy condition on accommodation is no longer satisfied. Compare (23b) and (24b) with the pairs of sentences in (25) and (26). (25) a. Jon and Bill are likely to win the lottery. Two people from New Y 6rk are, too. In (25) and (26) narrow focus on the head noun allows for accommodation of an appropriate LF. The difference between these sentences and (23b, 24b) strongly suggests that the anti-disambiguation depends on the presence of accommodation seeking material. Compare now (23b) and (24b) with the construction in (27), which were pointed out to me by Kai von Fintel. I assume that the focus structures of the two sentences are as represented in (27').
(27) a. John is likely to win the lottery. Two 6ther people from NY are, too. In both (27'a) and (27'b), the economy condition on accommodation is satisfied.
(In both cases accommodation is triggered by novel material which is non-F marked.) Furthermore, in both cases it is possible to accommodate an LF with Inverse Scope which will belong to the focus value of SE . To see this, focus on (27'b): A entails the LF of a boy likes every teacher with Inverse Scope and the latter is a member of F(SE ). The relevant difference between (27b) and (24b) is that in (24b) the only way to satisfy (13) is by excluding the numeral two from the F-marked constituent, and such a focus structure makes Parallelism unattainable. In (27b), by contrast, it is possible to focus the numeral and not the common noun, thus making the accommodatable LF an appropriate alternative to SE .
When Indirect Parallelism allows ellipsis with no identity
In 3.1 we saw that even in cases where an identity condition of the sort proposed by Rooth is satisfied, the effects of the economy condition on accommodation are nevertheless visible. If these cases have been analyzed correctly, it follows that an economy condition on accommodation must be postulated on grounds independent of the account of the difference between E and PR, thus making the identity condition redundant. In this section, I will examine a case in which an elided VP is allowed to be non-identical to an antecedent VP. This case is problematic for an identity condition on ellipsis. However, we will see that it is a predicted consequence of focus theory together with an economy condition on accommodation. The upshot will be that the identity condition on ellipsis is not only redundant but also gives the wrong results.
Consider the "abstract cause subject alternation" in (28) (Levin 1993:81) .
(28) a. John proved that I'm innocent with fingerprints. b. Fingerprints proved that I'm innocent.
Given this alternation, it seems reasonable to assume that the predicates in the two sentences assign different thematic roles to the subject and are thus not identical. Evidence that this is the case is provided by the impossibility of ellipsis in (29). (29) The status of the construction in (29) is predicted by an identity condition of the sort proposed by Rooth. It is also predicted by Parallelism together with the economy condition on accommodation. (The antecedent sentence does not belong to the focus value of the ellipsis sentence and accommodation is impossible.) However, the predictions diverge in cases where the ellipsis sentence contains accommodation-seeking material. Evidence against the identity condition and in favor of the economy condition on accommodation comes from the contrast in (30) . Consider first the unacceptability of (30b). The unacceptability of this sentence is by assumption the result of the elided VP and its antecedent being non-identical. Why then is (30a) acceptable. I suggest that in (30a) it is possible to accommodate the LF AC ( =Fingerprints that John presented proved that I'm innocent ) and that AC E F(SE). 1 2 If this suggestion is correct, there must be something that blocks a similar accommodation in (30b) (Fingerprints that Bill presented proved that I'm innocent => Bill proved that I'm innocent) . The economy condition on accommodation serves this purpose; the ellipsis sentence doesn't contain novel material that is non-F-marked and therefore has no trigger for accommodation.
Strengthening the economy condition on accommodation
In the previous section, I've provided independent evidence in favor of an economy condition on accommodation. I've attempted to show that the condition is needed independently of an account of the difference between E and PR, and that it can deal with certain cases that are problematic for Rooth's identity condition. However, it turns out that there are still differences between E and PR that the economy condition cannot account for.
In section 2.3, we saw that the economy condition distinguishes between (8) and (6) (repeated below) based on the fact that (8) contains no accommodation-seeking material. However, this explanation predicts that (8) would be rescued by minimal changes in the subject position; all that is needed is the addition of some accommodation seeking material. (3 1) demonstrates that this is not the case. The economy condition on accommodation in (13) is, therefore, too weak to account for the difference between E and PRo (31) *Every boy called Mary an idiot. Many GIRLS did too <insult her>.
How is (3 1) different from the cases we've discussed in section 3 (in which the accommodation-seeking material licensed the necessary accommodation)? I would like to suggest that (3 1) doesn't allow the necessary accommodation (Many boys insulted Mary) because there is an alternative accommodation (Many boys called Mary an idot) which satisfies the requirements of the accommodation seeking material. More specifically, I would like to suggest that the economy condition on accommodation needs to be stronger. It is not sufficient for accommodation to have a trigger. For an accommodation to be possible it must be "minimal" given the trigger. An accommodation is minimal given a trigger when there is no alternative accommodation that is closer to the targeted antecedent and contains the trigger (the accommodation-seeking material):
Accommodation of a new antecedent for S, AC, must be minimal given the accommodation-seeking material in S, a. 13
a. An accommodation, AC, is minimal given accommodation-seeking material a, if there is no alternative accommodation, AC', such that Focus, PARALLELISM AND ACCOMMODATION AC' contains a and A C' is closer to the existing antecedent sentence, A, than AC is. b. AC' is closer to A than AC is, when the accommodated material of AC' is a proper subset of the accommodated material of AC. c. The accommodated material of an accommodation AC consists of the lexical material which is present in AC and absent in A. 1 4
The economy condition in (13) follows from the condition in (32). (If S contains no accommodation-seeking material, the minimal accommodation is the trivial one A C=A.) Consequently, the arguments I presented in section 3 in favor of (13) are also arguments in favor of (32). (For reasons of space, I leave it for the reader to verify that in all the cases discussed in which accommodation was possible, the condition in (32) is satified.)
A consequence for the nature of Focus
Throughout this paper I've assumed that focus values are sets of LF structures. Under this view one sentence satisfies the focus requirements of another when the LF structure of the former belongs to the focus value of the latter. However, since Rooth 1985 it has been assumed that focus values are sets of unstructured meanings. In this section, I would like to present two arguments in favor of the assumption that the members of a focus value are structured objects (either LF structures or structured meanings).
The first argument has already been presented in Wold 1995, though under a slightly different approach to E and PR. Consider the following difference between E and PR, which was observed in Rooth 1992. (34) a. 7 is greater than or equal to 7. 5 is greater than or equal to itself, tOO. b. 7 is greater than or equal to 7. 5 is, too *<greater than or equal to itself>.
This difference was taken by Rooth to be an additional argument in favor of an identity condition on E. The reason that E is not licensed in (34b), Rooth suggests, is that the VP and it's antecedent are not identical. (The antecedent contains the name 7 in a position where the elided VP contains the anaphor itself.) Assuming that the arguments presented in this paper are successful there must be an alternative account for the contrast in (34). More specifically, we would like the un acceptability of (34b) to follow from the unavailability of a necessary accommodation. However, if we assume that focus values are sets of unstructured meanings, (34b) would satisfy Direct Parallelism and accommodation would be irrelevant. To see this consider the focus value of the ellipsis sentence in (34b). Under Rooth's assumption, this focus value would contain the set of propositions which would result from applying the denotation of the matrix predicate (is greater than or equal to itself) to each alternative to the denotation of 5. One element in the focus vlue is [Ay. y [is greater than or equal to] y] ( [7] ), which is an unstructured proposition identical to [7 is greater than or equal to 7], the denotation of the antecedent sentence.
If we assume that the members of a focus value are structured objects (either syntactic structures, i.e. LFs, or structured propositions) the problem is overcome. The focus value of the ellipsis sentence contains LFs (or structured propositions) of the form x Ay .y is greater than or equal to y, and the antecedent sentence doesn't have the appropriate form. In (34a) this could be corrected via accommodation of the LF 7 Ay.y is greater or equal to y but in (34b) accommodation is impossible given the lack of accommodation-seeking material.
Assuming that there is no identity condition on ellipsis, we are forced to conclude that focus values are sets of structured objects. The next argument in favor of the conclusion is independent of the status of an identity condition on ellipsis. Consider the ECs in (35), and their counterparts with PR in (36). (32 >'V) * ('v>32) b. Ken Hale speaks more than 3 of these Australian languages.
Rob Pensalfini, doesn't.
(not>more than 3) * (more than 3>not) c. A boy is talking to Mary and a girl is, to every teacher. b. Ken Hale speaks more than 3 of these Australian languages. Rob Pensalfini, doesn't sp eak more than 3 o/ these Australian languages.
(not>more than 3) * (more than 3>not) c. A boy is talking to Mary and a girl is talking, to every teacher.
In these constructions, the ellipsis/reduction sentences are disambiguated in favor of Surface Scope. This should follow from Parallelism together with Scope Economy as outlined in section 3.1.2: the antecedent sentence is semantically identical under its two potential interpretations and is therefore restricted to Surface Scope; consequently, given Parallelism (and given the fact that accommodation cannot obviate the verdict of Direct Parallelism in these cases, see Fox in press) the ellipsis sentence is restricted to Surface Scope. However, this result would be lost if focus values contain unstructured propositions. The reason is trivial. The antecedent sentence is semantically equivalent under Surface and Inverse Scope. Therefore the proposition denoted by the antecedent is identical irrespective of the syntactic scopal relations. In other words, whether or not the antecedent denotes a proposition in the focus value of the ellipsis sentence will be determined irrespective of the syntactic structure of the antecedent. This means that there is no way for Parallelism and Scope Economy to account for the disambiguation in (35-36) . If, on the other hand, focus values contain structured objects, disambiguations follows straightforwardly.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that E and PR obey the same constraints. They both obey a parallelism condition which is a direct consequence of focus theory and an economy condition on accommodation. The differences between E and PR is not a consequence of an identity condition on E. Rather it follows from the fact that the economy condition on accommodation is sensitive to accommodation-seeking material of which there is much more in PRo 1 Throughout this paper, I use CAPS for syllables that receive pitch accent, small italics for constituents that are phonologically reduced (and hence receive no pitch accent), and the subscript F for constituents that are focused. 2 Various interesting questions arise regarding the nature of focus, and in particular focus projection. See Fox, in press, chapter 3 footnotes 10 and 11. 3 Contrary to standard assumptions, I take focus values to be sets of syntactic structures (rather than sets of unstructured meanings). The focus value of a given sentence is the set of LF structures that are identical to the LF of a sentence modulo the focus-marked constituents (which can be substituted by appropriate alternatives). Evidence in favor of this view of focus is presented in section 5. When I talk about a sentence, S, being a member of a focus value, this should be understood as a statement about the LF structure of S. will provide a better account. In any event, the problem arises for PR as well as for E and is thus independent of whether or not there is an identity condition on E.
7 Some speakers don't allow for any sloppy identity in (9). The judgment of these speakers are irrelevant for Rooth's argument. Rooth's point is that if sloppy identity is possible in (9) under parallel dependencies, it is possible in (10) with non-parallel dependencies, hence the argument for Indirect Parallelism. 8 A similar conclusion could potentially be drawn from Jacobson's (1998) observation that a relative clause with pied-piping can be elided when its antecedent contains no pied-piping:
(i) This is the man I met. And this is the man the FAther of whom I did.
If Pied-piping involves obligatory reconstruction, the VPs are not identical at LF. Jacobson uses the paradigm to argue against obligatory reconstruction, but it can also be seen as an argument against an identity condition (see Fox 1999b).
9 Jacobson (1998) argues that the identity condition raises conceptual problems for non-variable-Free semantics: Rooth's identity condition (as pointed out in Heim 1997) must ignore variable names, and no explanation is offered for this fact. To the extent that there are arguments in favor of variables (and to the extent that there is no natural explanation for the fact that variables are ignored) there might be an argument here against the identity condition. 10 Mats Rooth (p.c.) points out that the effect disappears if we replace the focus verb deny with the verb doubt. He also pointed out that this difference would follow if doubt decomposes to not >agree. No t could be focused and agree can serve as accommodation-seeking material. Deny might decompose to claim >not, but given that there is no accommodatable antecedent that contains the verb claim with Mary as subject, both claim and not would have to be focused. 11 For a more detailed discussion, see Fox (in press ).
12 That the accommodation is necessary is evident from the fact that (30a) is good only under the (accommodated) assumption that John used fingerprints in his proof. In Fox (in press) I use the minimal pair in (i), which makes the same point. I changed the construction here to make the role of accommodation more evident. The reason I need to appeal to Fss(A) rather than to a simple focus value is the phenomena of anti-disambiguation discussed in 3.1.2. The necessary accommodation for anti-disambiguation (the accommodation with Inverse Scope) is a sentence which doesn't belong to the focus value of the antecedent, A, unless A receives sentential focus. Therefore, if the definition of 'closer' were to appeal to standard focus values, the potential accommodation with Surface Scope would block the necessary accommodation with Inverse Scope. However, the accommodation with Inverse Scope belongs to Fss(A) when only the subject is focused, and thus is a minimal accommodation.
